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Mark Tuil and Louis Visscher
1. INTRODUCTION1
Civil litigation serves a multitude of goals, many of which were explicitly 
touched upon in the previous chapters. Civil litigation in the fi rst instance 
is a way of resolving confl icts. Depending on the type of confl ict at hand, 
the plaintiff  for example may want the court to issue a declaration regard-
ing the unlawfulness of the defendant’s behaviour, or he may want the 
defendant to restore the status quo ante, to refrain from further infringe-
ments, to perform his contractual duties, to compensate his losses, or to 
restitute illegitimate benefi ts. In essence, civil litigation is a way to realise 
rights and entitlements, without having to resort to vigilantism.
In addition, civil litigation is a driving force behind legal development. 
The continuous fl ow of cases forces (or maybe better: enables) courts 
to fi nd new solutions for existing problems. An ever- changing society 
is confronted with confl icts which legislators cannot all foresee ex ante. 
However, the ex post character of civil litigation enables courts to seek 
solutions to the arisen issues.
Furthermore, even though the confl ict resolving goal of civil litigation 
in essence is retrospective to the confl ict at hand, the legal norms which 
are created by the courts in deciding the cases may very well have an ex 
ante impact on the parties involved in the confl ict, as well as on other 
actors. Put diff erently, civil litigation may also serve the goal of deterrence, 
because it shows prospective norm violators which sanctions could result 
from their lawbreaking behaviour.
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2.  THE PROBLEM OF FINANCING CIVIL 
LITIGATION
Irrespective of the goals which one ascribes to civil litigation, these goals 
can only be reached if litigation indeed takes place. However, many 
obstacles to bringing a civil claim exist. For example, the potential plain-
tiff  may not know that a norm violation has occurred, he may fear that he 
will not be able to meet the required standard of proof, or he may decide 
to wait for others to bring a claim so that he can take a free ride on these 
eff orts.
The obstacle that forms the main topic of this Volume consists of the 
costs of bringing a civil claim. If these costs outweigh the expected benefi ts 
of the civil claim to the plaintiff  (both costs and benefi ts may be monetary 
and/or non- monetary), it is very likely that the potential plaintiff  will 
decide not to bring a claim at all. In economic terms, he remains ration-
ally apathetic (see Chapter 2 by Visscher and Schepens and Chapter 4 
by Keske, Renda and Van den Bergh). This problem is exacerbated if a 
potential plaintiff  is risk- averse so that he does not want to run the risk 
of having to pay high legal fees (possibly including the legal costs of the 
opposing party, should the plaintiff  lose), if the funds for bringing legal 
claims are limited or in case of widespread, small losses (trifl e damage or 
so- called ‘scattered damage’).
This fi nancing problem may be combated in many diff erent ways. 
Two instruments which lie outside the primary scope of this book, are 
publicly subsidised legal aid and public rather than private enforcement. 
Cutbacks on legal aid are exactly one of the reasons why the issue of 
fi nancing civil litigation is becoming more and more important. Besides, 
as Faure, Fernhout and Philipsen point out it does not provide a solution 
to the fi nancing problem for the so- called ‘sandwich- class’, that is the 
people too wealthy for subsidised legal aid but not wealthy enough to be 
able to self- fi nance civil litigation. Public enforcement strictly speaking is 
no solution to the problem of fi nancing civil litigation, because it removes 
the need for civil litigation in the fi rst place. It lies beyond the scope of 
this chapter and Volume to go into details into the reasons why public 
enforcement is no perfect solution. In many areas of law, public and 
private enforcement coexist, showing the need for private enforcement 
and hence the importance of solutions to the fi nancing problem. Even 
in some settings where public enforcement until now has been the para-
mount form of enforcement, private enforcement is gaining in impor-
tance (see Chapter 4 which deals with private enforcement of  competition 
and consumer law).
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3.  THE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS DISCUSSED IN THIS 
VOLUME
This book focuses on several possible ways to deal with the issue of fi nanc-
ing civil litigation, other than subsidised legal aid and public enforcement. 
Specifi cally, the following methods are discussed:
 ● Cost Shifting or Fee Shifting: diff erent ways in which the costs of 
litigation are divided between plaintiff  and defendant are analysed. 
In this respect a dichotomy is created between the ‘American Rule’ 
(where each party bears its own legal expenses) and the ‘English 
Rule’ (where the losing party pays the litigation costs of the prevail-
ing party, also called the ‘loser- pays- principle’), although it should 
be noted that in practise most jurisdictions, including the American 
and English, use a mix between the two extremes. Also other rules, 
such as ‘one way fee shifting’ are treated;
 ● Fee Arrangements: in many of the chapters in this book, the issue of 
lawyer’s fees appears. Hourly fees, contingency fees and conditional 
fee arrangements all infl uence the costs to the plaintiff  of bringing a 
civil claim. Especially ‘no cure, no pay’ or ‘no win, less fee’ arrange-
ments may reduce the hurdle of bringing a civil claim. However, fee 
arrangements turn out to aff ect much more than only the costs of 
bringing the claim, as is shown in several contributions;
 ● Legal Expense Insurance: Before- the event insurance (BTE) and 
After- the- event insurance (ATE) reduce the fi nancial burden of civil 
litigation to the parties involved. Especially in Chapter 5 of Van 
Boom analyses the strengths and weaknesses of these instruments in 
overcoming the fi nancing problem;
 ● Group Litigation: in Chapter 4 of Keske, Renda and Van den Bergh 
discuss a diff erent approach to the fi nancing problem: group litigation. 
In essence, through sharing (some of) the costs of litigation by bring-
ing similar cases collectively in one procedure, the costs per plaintiff  
dramatically decrease, which reduces rational apathy. However, other 
problems such as principal–agent problems between the lawyer and the 
represented parties may occur and obviously, the collective claim has 
to be fi nanced. Hence, the topics of cost shifting, fee arrangements and 
legal expense insurance are also relevant in a setting of group litigation;
 ● Public Funds: Keske, Renda and Van den Bergh as well as Faure, 
Fernhout and Philipsen discuss several ‘contingency style litigation 
funds’, which cover plaintiff s’ costs. Plaintiff s only pay a fee to the 
fund in case of success, but the fund retains the lawyer on the basis 
of the existing fee arrangements (often hourly fees);
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 ● Assignment and Securitization of the Claim: in Chapter 6 of Pinna 
analyses yet another avenue which could be taken. An injured party 
could, at least in theory, assign the claim to a third party. The price 
received can be regarded as his compensation, which he receives 
even before liability and the extent of the losses have been estab-
lished by means of litigation. The assignee could securitize the claim, 
which – again at least in theory – could solve the fi nancing problem.
The chapter in this book target the topic of fi nancing civil litigation from 
a legal, an empirical and an economic perspective. By combining the three 
approaches, we believe that a better picture of the fi nancing problem 
can be painted than by focussing on only one of these perspectives. The 
economic approach can, on the basis of the assumptions that are made 
regarding human behaviour, predict the eff ects of the diff erent instruments 
on issues such as the level of claims, the quality of the claims, the duration 
of trial, the possible misalignment of incentives of plaintiff s, lawyers and/
or insurance companies, et cetera. The empirical approach can provide 
valuable information on which instruments are actually used in practice, 
test the theoretical hypotheses derived from the economic theory, and 
indicate the relative size of the predicted, sometimes opposing, eff ects. 
The legal approach can show which instruments are actually available 
and can expose relevant legal diff erences between the various forms of the 
instruments, which from a non- legal perspective may look the same at fi rst 
glance. It can also show the purpose of a rule and the principle on which 
the rule is based and thus indicate the ‘no- go- areas’.
Besides the contributions of European authors, which discuss the new 
trends that are visible in Europe, Hensler provides an American perspec-
tive on the topic of fi nancing civil litigation. This is especially important as 
in European discussions regarding aspects of civil litigation, for example, 
contingency fees or class actions, the ‘American situation’ is being used as 
an example of how not to proceed. Hensler’s contribution shows that the 
fear for the ‘American situation’ is often ill- founded.
The fact that the goals of civil litigation can only be reached if fi nanc-
ing problems are overcome shows the societal importance of analyzing 
the potential solutions. This holds even more now private enforcement 
is becoming more important in the European context, and the budgets 
available for subsidised legal aid become tighter. In Chapter 7 Fenn and 
Rickman explicitly deal with empirical research regarding the relationship 
between a decrease in public funding and an increase in other solutions to 
the fi nancing problem, such as conditional fee arrangements.
As becomes apparent from several chapters in this book, the instruments 
under discussion may provide an additional benefi t besides improving 
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access to justice. They may also entail a selection eff ect towards higher 
quality claims, which would result in especially more meritorious claims 
being brought. The way in which the various instruments infl uence access 
to justice, quality of the claims, the interplay between the parties involved 
et cetera, will be subsequently discussed in more detail below.
4. COST SHIFTING
Cost shifting, also called ‘fee shifting’ (but we use the term cost shifting 
to avoid confusion with the alternative instrument of ‘fee arrangements’) 
considers the question of which party bears which legal costs. Under the 
American rule each party bears its own costs, while under the English Rule 
the costs are shifted to the losing party. In practise, there is a ‘gray area’ 
between the American and the English Rule, now often not all costs are 
shifted under the English Rule (see also Pinna), for example because they 
are regarded as excessive (also see the judgment of the European Court of 
Human Rights from December 15, 2009, in the case Financial Times Ltd 
and others v. the United Kingdom).2
Visscher and Schepens describe the eff ects of cost shifting on the basis 
of a review of mostly theoretical literature. Whether the level of suit 
will increase under the English Rule as compared to the American Rule 
depends among others on the assessment of the plaintiff  of his chances 
to win (in which case he does not bear his litigation costs) and on his 
degree of risk aversion (under the English Rule risk- averse plaintiff s will 
sue less often, given that the stakes now also include the litigation costs. 
Van Boom discusses the way in which after the event insurance in a sense 
forces the losing party to fi nance the risk aversion of the winning party, 
now he also has to reimburse the insurance premium). The fact that losing 
plaintiff s under the English Rule have to bear all litigation costs in theory 
discourages potential plaintiff s to bring weak claims, while the fact that 
winning plaintiff s do not bear any litigation costs stimulates bringing 
high- quality claims. The existing, albeit limited, empirical research seems 
to corroborate this hypothesis. Cost shifting therefore could be regarded 
as an instrument which lowers the fi nancing problem, especially for meri-
torious claims. However, the overall eff ect of cost shifting measures also 
strongly depends on the fee arrangement in place.
With regards to group litigation, Keske, Renda and Van den Bergh 
argue that the English Rule may hinder this form of litigation due to the 
increased risk it entails. They doubt, however, that a shift to the American 
Rule would lead to more representative actions being brought by, for 
example, consumer associations, because the decision of whether or not 
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to sue does not only depend on the costs, but more importantly on the 
expected benefi ts. They also argue that the increased risk caused by the 
English Rule in group litigation may be mitigated by the use of contin-
gency fees or conditional fee arrangements, because such an arrangement 
shifts the risk from the plaintiff  to his lawyer. One- way fee shifting would 
encourage litigation even more in a setting of contingency fees, because if 
the case is won, the losing party pays the litigation costs, and if the case 
is lost, due to the contingency fee the plaintiff (s) pay(s) nothing anyway.
5. FEE ARRANGEMENTS
Many chapters in this book devote attention to the payment structure of 
lawyers. Legal fees form a substantial part of the costs of civil litigation 
and hence of the fi nancing problems. Under hourly fees, the lawyer has to 
be paid on the basis of the time he has spent on the case, irrespective of 
the outcome. This may form a substantial hurdle to civil litigation being 
brought. However, arrangements that link the payment to the outcome of 
the result could overcome this hurdle.
This book illustrates the need for clear defi nitions. Faure, Fernhout and 
Philipsen analyse the main forms of fee arrangements. ‘Contingency fees’ 
are a combination of ‘no cure, no pay’ and quota pars litis. Hence, if the 
case is lost the lawyer is not paid, and if the case is won the lawyer receives 
a percentage of the proceeds. A ‘conditional fee arrangement’ (CFA) in 
their defi nition entails that a losing lawyer receives nothing while a winning 
lawyer receives a success fee (a fl at fee or an additional percentage on top of 
the regular fee). Some of the other contributions in this Volume apply the 
same concept. Keske, Renda and Van den Bergh, however, defi ne a CFA 
as an arrangement where a losing lawyer only receives his basic fee while 
a winning lawyer also receives the success fee. This shows the need for 
clear defi nitions, because the conclusions reached by these authors when 
comparing contingency fees with CFA are strongly infl uenced by their 
defi nition of CFA. We do not argue here that one defi nition is better than 
the other, but as Faure, Fernhout and Philipsen rightfully state, ‘the rather 
liberal use of concepts such as ‘contingency fees’, ‘no cure no pay’, ‘no win 
no fee’ and ‘success fees’ may give rise to many misunderstandings’, which 
would cloud the already complicated debate. The last form of fee arrange-
ments which Faure, Fernhout and Philipsen distinguish is the ‘Dutch 
agreement’, which is a combination of ‘no win, less fee’ and either quota 
pars litis or an unrestricted success fee. In our view, the CFA of Keske, 
Renda and Van den Bergh forms an example of such a ‘Dutch agreement’.
Contingency fees reduce the fi nancing problem, because a losing 
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plaintiff  bears no litigation costs, while a winning plaintiff  fi nances these 
costs out of the proceeds of the claim.3 In a sense, the lawyer pre- fi nances 
and insures these costs so that (especially risk averse) plaintiff s may bring 
suit where they would not have done so under hourly fees. The hourly 
wages of contingency fee lawyers will be higher than those of hourly fee 
lawyers because the former will charge a premium for their fi nancing and 
insurance service. Fenn and Rickman indeed fi nd empirically that under 
result- based fees, the plaintiff ’s net reward is lower than under hourly fees. 
Hensler shows that many victims in personal injury cases prefer contin-
gency fees over hourly fees or fl at fees despite the lower reward. Whether 
the improved access to justice due to result- based fees leads to an increase 
in the level of suits depends on many factors, such as the impact of the 
threat of litigation on the behaviour of actors and, very importantly, on 
the role of lawyers as gatekeepers. After all, lawyers receive incentives to 
better screen the cases which they are willing to take, because their remu-
neration depends on winning the case (see Visscher and Schepens, Faure, 
Fernhout and Philipsen, Keske, Renda and Van den Bergh, Fenn and 
Rickman and Hensler). This gate- keeping role has the potential to increase 
the fraction of high- merit cases, so that result- based fees increase access to 
justice especially for meritorious claims. Empirical research verifi es this 
gate- keeping role, but it also shows that cases with a relative low value are 
often turned down. The fear of a fl ood of litigation and for many meritless 
cases being brought seems unwarranted, both from a theoretical and an 
empirical perspective. The contributions of Faure, Fernhout and Philipsen 
and Hensler show that many forms of result- based fees are applied on 
both sides of the Atlantic, without any of the alleged problems as a result. 
Fenn and Rickman argue that CFA is becoming more and more impor-
tant in England and Wales (the countries which they have studied) as legal 
aid disappears as a result of policy.
Fee arrangements do not only impact the possibilities of fi nancing civil 
litigation, but they also may impact the incentives provided to the rel-
evant actors in civil litigation. Under an hourly fee system, the payment 
of the lawyer depends on how many hours he puts in. Under result- based 
systems, however, it is the result which is decisive for the remuneration. 
Under the fi rst system, spending more time on the case directly benefi ts 
the lawyer (of course, reputational eff ects and legal ethics may pose limits 
to this mechanism), while under the second system this is only the case if 
the additional eff orts are made up for by a better outcome. This line of 
reasoning touches upon the topic of principal–agent problems. Ideally, 
the interests of lawyers are perfectly aligned with those of his clients and 
of society. In practise, this is not the case. Under hourly fees, lawyers may 
put in more hours than is in the interest of their clients and of society. 
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Result- based fees reduce this problem and better align the interests of 
lawyer and client, because both now have an interest in winning the case. 
This reason, which is an advantage from the point of view of agency 
theory, is exactly mentioned as a problem in many legal debates regarding 
the introduction of contingency fees. Faure, Fernhout and Philipsen show 
that in many European countries where contingency fees are not allowed, 
mainly or partly on the basis of this argument, other forms of result- based 
fees are allowed and used, apparently without (major) problems.
Another way in which contingency fees may combat the principal–agent 
problem is that lawyers may use the fee as a way to signal their quality 
(Visscher and Schepens, Faure, Fernhout and Philipsen, Keske, Renda 
and Van den Bergh). Hensler however states that there is little evidence 
that lawyers indeed compete through their fee and that only in high- value 
aviation accident litigation is there evidence of price competition between 
lawyers.
Result- based fees, however, do not perfectly address the principal–agent 
problems. Where hourly fees may lead a lawyer to spend too much time 
on a case, contingency fees may result in the opposite problem. After 
all, the lawyer bears the full costs of additional eff orts, but only receives 
a percentage of the additional benefi ts (Visscher and Schepens, Faure, 
Fernhout and Philipsen). In addition, under the assumption that a lawyer 
can better assess the quality of a case than the client (especially if the 
latter is a one- shotter), lawyers may negotiate a too- high percentage when 
taking a case on a contingency fee basis, or they may give biased advice 
regarding the decision of the client to opt for hourly fees or contingency 
fees. Furthermore, the fee arrangement may impact the incentives to 
settle. Theoretically it can be argued that contingency fees lead to more 
and earlier settlements than hourly fees, because the lawyer secures his 
fee with fewer eff orts. However, literature that includes lawyer’s eff orts 
in the analysis argues that contingency fees on the opposite lead to fewer 
settlements, because lawyers spend less time on the case during trial. 
Rejecting settlement off ers can also be a strategic move: by signalling 
confi dence in the case if it were to go to trial, a lawyer may extract a better 
settlement off er in subsequent rounds. Empirical research seems to cor-
roborate the fi nding that contingency fees lead to fewer settlements (for 
higher amounts) than hourly fees, and that limitations on contingency fees 
decrease the probability that a case proceeds to trial. However, Fenn and 
Rickman also discuss empirical research which shows the opposite result. 
As Faure, Fernhout and Philipsen state, more empirical research is needed 
to yield more defi nite answers. They do recognise the problem, which is 
also mentioned by Fenn and Rickman, that it may be hard to acquire the 
necessary data for this.
M2459 - TUIL PRINT.indd   182 23/09/2010   17:16
 Lessons to be learned  183
6. LEGAL EXPENSE INSURANCE
In Chapter 5 Van Boom focuses on legal expense insurance, both in the 
form of ‘Before the event insurance’ (BTE) and ‘After the event insurance’ 
(ATE). These forms of insurance may overcome the fi nancing problem, 
because the insurance company now bears the risk of having to bear legal 
expenses. Under BTE a risk- averse actor purchases insurance against legal 
expenses he may have to bear if he would become involved in a confl ict. 
Under ATE, policy is concluded after a confl ict has occurred which will 
likely lead to litigation. Van Boom describes how the development of legal 
expense insurance depends heavily on domestic institutional factors, such 
as the extent of publicly funded legal aid (also see Fenn and Rickman) 
and the intensity of regulation of legal services. Also the rules on cost 
shifting, fee arrangements (Faure, Fernhout and Philipsen describe for 
several countries how the availability of legal expense insurance aff ects the 
development of result- based fees) as well as cultural factors are relevant.
Because BTE solves the fi nancing problem and covers the risk of having 
to bear large costs, one may expect an increase in the number of suits. This 
holds even more now through adverse selection mainly high- risk actors 
would take out insurance and they may exhibit moral hazard so that more 
confl icts may arise. However, the insurance industry seems quite able to 
limit these eff ects. Moreover, insurers may function as gatekeepers, screen-
ing the cases on their merits, so that predominantly meritorious claims 
would be covered. There is no clear empirical support for this theoretical 
possibility (Visscher and Schepens).
Just as with fee arrangements, the interests of all parties involved may 
not be perfectly aligned, leading again to principal–agent problems. Van 
Boom discusses the European Directive on legal expense insurance, which 
tries to neutralise potential confl icts of interest between insured and 
insurer, which calls for implementation of arbitration or ADR procedures 
to quickly settle such confl icts, and which requires a free choice of council. 
The extent to which insurers are able to keep the costs of litigation low, 
depends among other factors on whether they can have in- house lawyers 
or whether they need to retain external lawyers. The diff erence in fi nanc-
ing (the insurer has already received the benefi ts through the premium 
and now wants to limit the costs, whereas the remuneration of an external 
lawyer may depend on the number of hours put in or the result achieved) 
provides diff erent behavioural incentives, with all the agency problems 
that come along. Van Boom therefore argues that the  free choice of 
council should be reconsidered. Also the interests of the insurer and the 
insured may be opposed. The insured may want to litigate more (also 
the lower quality claims) and settle less (because trial costs are covered) 
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and for higher amounts (because the threat to go to trial is more cred-
ible). The insurer can try to limit these problems by using deductibles, 
merit tests, maximum coverage, et cetera (Visscher and Schepens). Fenn 
and Rickman mention that settlement delay in England and Wales was 
lower under BTE than under other forms of litigation funding, which 
suggests that indeed insurers are successful in countering principal–agent 
problems.
Van Boom distinguishes two forms of ATE arrangements: ATE funding 
and ATE insurance. ATE funding, also called ‘third party funding’, 
means that the provider fi nances all costs involved in the claim against a 
‘premium’ (varying with the value of the claim and the stage at which the 
dispute is ended) which is only paid if the case is won. The provider investi-
gates the merits of the claim and only fi nances viable claims. It is especially 
used for commercial claimants with high value claims with a high prob-
ability of success. Given these characteristics, Van Boom argues that ATE 
funding looks more like contingency fees than like insurance.
The combination of ATE insurance and CFA results in an instrument 
which is very benefi cial to claimants (also see Fenn and Rickman on this 
combination). Due to CFA, a losing defendant does not have to pay his 
own legal costs, but due to the English Rule he does have to pay the legal 
costs of the prevailing party. The ATE insurance covers those costs. If the 
claimant wins, he can recover both his legal costs (which due to the CFA 
success fee may be substantial) and his ATE insurance premium from the 
defendant. Hence, losing defendants also bear the costs which risk- averse 
plaintiff s make to cover their risk. The only thing a plaintiff  may lose is his 
ATE insurance premium if he loses. Van Boom describes a recent develop-
ment which even removes this last risk: a self- insured deferred premium. 
The premium is only paid if the case is won, and it is then paid by the 
losing defendant. This instrument induces lawyers and insurers only to 
take cases on this basis if there is a large enough probability of success. 
The defendant may receive a (too?) large incentive to settle such cases, 
given the large fi nancial consequences of losing in court. Therefore, this 
instrument, although it is very able to overcome the fi nancing problem, 
may come at the cost of excessive litigation and over deterrence.
7. GROUP LITIGATION
Keske, Renda and Van den Bergh discuss the possibilities to amelio-
rate the fi nancing problems through the use of several forms of group 
litigation, which is especially relevant in cases of scattered damage (where 
the problems of rational apathy and asymmetric information play an 
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important role). In group litigation, either an informed individual party 
or an association initiates the proceeding. The superior information, as 
compared to that of uninformed individuals, tackles the asymmetric infor-
mation. Rational apathy is addressed because it is no longer an individual 
victim with relatively low losses as compared to the costs of litigation who 
has to start the suit. The costs are either divided among more plaintiff s, or 
borne by for example a representative organization.
If group litigation in the form of a collective action or class action takes 
place, the extent to which rational apathy is solved depends on the way 
in which the collective is formed. Under an opt- in regime the problem 
may persist, because individuals have to become active in order to join 
the group. Under opt- out and mandatory forms, rational apathy is better 
overcome. An often- heard resistance against opt- out and mandatory 
collective actions is that it would deprive individuals from ‘their day in 
court’, so it would frustrate access to (individual) justice. In our view it is 
important to realise that in many instances the problem of rational apathy 
would avoid most individuals from bringing a claim anyway so that this 
argument is often an empty shell. Collective actions in a sense increase 
access to justice rather than frustrate it because as a member of the group, 
the individual victim may receive some compensation where individually 
he would not have brought a claim. And even if the individual would not 
receive individual compensation, for example because a cy pres system is 
applied, the possibility of collective claims may provide deterrent incen-
tives to potential wrongdoers so that potential victims still benefi t from 
reduced risks.
A drawback of group litigation may be that it introduces several forms 
of principal–agent problems. A representative organization or a lawyer 
litigating on behalf of a group of victims may have diff erent interests at 
heart than the victims themselves. Especially in cases where the value of 
each individual claim is limited, victims will not spend much eff ort on 
monitoring the agent. Keske, Renda and Van den Bergh give examples of 
class action settlements which are rather benefi cial to the lawyers and/or 
the defendant, but not so much for the plaintiff s, for example the so- called 
coupon settlements (also see Hensler on this issue). In Section 5 above 
it already became clear that fee arrangements may infl uence the agency 
problems. This holds even more in group litigation, now the plaintiff s have 
fewer incentives to monitor their representative. Hensler discusses Rule 
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which contains instruments 
to combat agency problems (such as the requirement that the class is ade-
quately represented and that proposed settlements have to be approved by 
the court).
The possibility of group litigation may also lead to frivolous suits: low 
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(or even ‘no’) quality claims being brought in order to distract a settle-
ment, because for the defendant settlement may be cheaper than trial 
(especially when potential reputational eff ects are incorporated), even in 
case of success.
Representative actions by, for example, consumer associations in the 
view of Keske, Renda and Van den Bergh do not solve the fi nancing 
problem as good as class actions (which are almost always combined 
with contingency fees). The association’s budget may not be large enough 
to fi nance the desired amount of litigation. Government funding could 
improve the situation, but also public budgets are limited. Furthermore, 
public funding may make the association too dependant on the govern-
ment. Given the remaining fi nancing problems, Keske, Renda and Van 
den Bergh advocate introduction of result- based fees. They also argue that 
agency problems may not be solved by representative actions, because the 
association may very well have interests which depart from those of the 
consumers at large. They suggest that agency problems are better solv-
able under collective actions fi nanced via contingency fees. Due to the 
characteristics of collective litigation, result- based fees stimulate collective 
litigation even more than individual litigation, so that it is a powerful tool 
to overcome the fi nancing problem.
8. PUBLIC FUNDS
Faure, Fernhout and Philipsen, as well as Keske, Renda and Van den 
Bergh give their attention to yet another way of fi nancing civil litiga-
tion: contingency- style public funds. For example in Hong Kong, the 
Supplementary Legal Aid Scheme (SLAS) after a merit test may take on 
a case on a contingency fee basis. Hence, the fund pays all costs and the 
plaintiff  only pays a contribution to the fund if he prevails. The lawyers, 
however, are paid by the fund on the basis of hourly fees. The fund, being 
a repeat player, is better able to monitor the lawyers than one- shot plain-
tiff s would be, so that this solution may reap the fruits of contingency fees 
(fi nancing civil litigation, especially for the sandwich class) while avoiding 
the agency problems that normally come along.
Keske, Renda and Van den Bergh argue that the success of such funds 
depends, among others, on the design of the fund (for example the percent-
age to be paid in case of success and the formalities involved in applying) 
and on the cost shifting rules which are in place. They describe a success-
ful Canadian fund as well as less successful Canadian and Australian 
funds. The SLAS discussed by Faure, Fernhout and Philipsen also seems 
 successful in addressing the problem of fi nancing civil litigation.
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9. ASSIGNMENT AND SECURITIZATION
Pinna discusses the possibility of transferring one’s claim to a third party. 
This way the victim receives an amount of money (the price paid be the 
assignee) even before any litigation has commenced. In a sense this is 
therefore no solution to the fi nancing problem as a whole, but it removes 
the fi nancing problem for the potential claimant altogether, because he 
does not bring the claim anymore. The price would depend on the value 
of the claim, the probability of success, the expected legal fees and a risk 
premium and it accounts for the time diff erence between the payment of 
the price and the outcome of the trial. The price would hence be lower 
than the losses of the victim, but the latter does not run a risk and bears 
no costs. It may therefore be an attractive scheme for victims who prefer 
receiving a lower amount now over the possibility of a higher amount 
later.
Pinna discusses potential legal hurdles regarding assignment of claims, 
such as the English prohibition of assignment of ‘mere rights of action’. 
He also shows that assignment of the proceeds of the claim is allowed 
under tort law (Hensler discusses some American examples of this idea), 
and under contract law assignment is allowed if the assignee has a genuine 
commercial interest. In France assignment is allowed, but if this is done 
after the claim is already brought to court, the defendant can extinguish 
the claim by refunding the assignee the price he paid for the claim. This 
greatly limits the possibilities for securitization, so the possibility for the 
assignee to sell his claim to another party, either through a succession of 
assignments or by setting up a special purpose investment vehicle.
The advantages of assignment in Pinna’s view are manifold. First, 
the injured party receives compensation quickly, without costs and risk. 
Second, it may benefi t the assignee because he regards it as an investment. 
Diff erences in risk attitude between the victim and the investor, as well as 
diff erences in time preference and access to capital can make assignment 
attractive to both. Third, it could accommodate group litigation in juris-
dictions which do not allow class actions. Even where they are allowed, 
assignment introduces less severe agency problems than class actions, 
provides higher awards for the victims and avoids the strict conditions 
surrounding class actions.
The main disadvantage according to Pinna is that assignment is only 
possible on a voluntary basis. In our view, the fact that the victim will never 
receive full compensation should be mentioned as a potential problem. Of 
course, in other situations where the plaintiff  bears litigation costs himself 
he is also not fully compensated, but instruments such as legal expense 
insurance or cost shifting could be more attractive to plaintiff s. Another 
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problem which is not discussed by Pinna is the fact that the assignee, when 
bringing the case to court, may have to obtain information from the victim 
in order to, for instance, meet the burden of proof. The fact that the victim 
has already received his money may make him less inclined to spend time 
and other resources on the case.
10. LESSONS TO BE LEARNED
Financing civil litigation is a topic which appears to have a much broader 
impact than merely the question of how to fi nance the costs of civil litiga-
tion. In various contributions to this Volume it became clear that the sepa-
rate instruments may not only aff ect access to justice, but also the quality 
of the claims that are being brought, the behaviour of plaintiff s, defend-
ants and legal representatives in settlement negotiations and during trial, 
as well as possibly the behaviour of parties before confl icts have arisen.
The complexity of the analysis further increases if one realises that many 
instruments are used in various combinations. Keske, Renda and Van 
den Bergh have given explicit attention to the diff erences between class 
actions and representative actions when combined with contingency fees 
or CFA, under various cost- shifting rules. Faure, Fernhout and Philipsen 
analyse the SLAS, which combines public funding with result- based fees. 
Van Boom discusses the potential pitfalls of the combination of ATE and 
CFA. Fenn and Rickman analyse the development in the use of various 
combinations in England and Wales, especially as a result of declining 
legal aid.
The theoretical predictions discussed in the contributions are not unam-
biguous and empirical research is not providing unambiguous results 
either (due to limited availability of data or diff erences in methodology). 
Several authors therefore call for more empirical research in order to 
better assess the eff ects of the alternatives schemes.
Notwithstanding the need for additional research, we believe that this 
book can already contribute to the debate on alternative ways of fi nancing 
civil litigation in Europe, besides the traditional form of subsidised legal 
aid. At this place, we would like to isolate two remarkable conclusions, or 
lessons for the future, which appear from the diff erent contributions.
First, when discussing the fi nancing problem, one should not separate 
this from the other eff ects that solutions to the fi nancing problem may 
have. Especially the potential of fee arrangements, cost shifting rules and 
insurance schemes to screen cases on their quality is an interesting aspect. 
By improving access to justice especially for meritorious claims, the goals 
which are served by civil litigation may be better reached. One should, 
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however, keep a critical approach to avoid undesirable eff ects, such as 
those of the combination of ATE and CFA, discussed by Van Boom.
Secondly, the substantial resistance in Europe against fi nancing instru-
ments in general and against US- style class actions and contingency fees 
specifi cally should be replaced by a more positive, open approach to these 
instruments. Faure, Fernhout and Philipsen show that many forms of 
result- based fees already exist in several European countries, apparently 
without causing substantial problems. Visscher and Schepens discuss the 
theoretical arguments pro and con contingency fees, where the arguments 
pro seem to outweigh those con. Keske, Renda and Van den Bergh argue 
that especially for scattered losses, class actions and contingency fees may 
be exactly what we need in order to enable eff ective private enforcement in 
the fi rst place. The overall picture which emerges therefore is that allowing 
contingency fees is Europe as a way to secure access to justice should be 
seriously considered.
This development should not be rejected with a simple reference to ‘the 
American situation’, because, as is shown by Hensler’s contribution, much 
of the resistance to this alleged situation is based on a misunderstanding 
or an incomplete assessment of this situation. Similarly, a reference to the 
traditional legal opposition on the bases of arguments such as that the 
lawyer should not have an own interest in winning the case or that contin-
gency fees cause a fl ood of litigation, under- appreciates or even neglects 
the theoretical arguments in favour of contingency fees, the empirical 
research which seems to corroborate the theoretical fi ndings and the fact 
that the system of hourly fees may cause principal–agent itself, which 
could be more serious than those of a contingency fee system. We there-
fore feel that those who still want to reject the instruments that have been 
discussed in this book have to provide ample reasons for their position.
This does, however, not mean that we advocate an unrestricted intro-
duction of these instruments. First of all, as has become apparent, the 
eff ect of the introduction of these instruments depends on other rules 
regarding litigation costs, the availability of other instruments and legal 
culture. We therefore feel that the instruments should only be introduced 
after a careful legal and economic analysis of their potential eff ects and 
subsequential empirical research. Similarly, we do advocate that existing 
instruments are carefully scrutinized and in the case where these instru-
ments seem to be particularly problematic, these instruments could be 
further regulated or in extreme cases banned. Some forms of the CFA 1 
ATE contracts reported on by Van Boom could serve as a good example.
This book does not solve all problems and does not answer all ques-
tions. We do think that, by combining legal, empirical and economic 
approaches, it has provided new insights and arguments in the legal debate 
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regarding fi nancing civil litigation. By doing this, it has also shown the 
direction in which future research could (or maybe: should) go. In other 
words, it shows New Horizons in Law and Economics of civil litigation: 
more legal research into the peculiarities of existing and newly developing 
instrument to fi nance civil litigation, more (theoretical) economic research 
to derive hypotheses about the way in which these instruments infl uence 
human behaviour, and more empirical research to test those hypotheses 
in practice.
NOTES
1. The authors would like to thank Michael Faure for his concluding remarks at the 
Conference, which were very useful for this chapter.
2. Application no. 821/03.
3. Other forms of result- based fees also have the potential of reducing the fi nancing 
problem, although less distinct in a case where a losing plaintiff  still bears some costs.
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